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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
THE WORLD COURT STATUTE AND IMPARTIALITY
OF THE JUDGES
William Samore*
In any court system, national or international, judges should
be impartial. Every judge of the fifteen-man International Court
of Justice is required by the International Court of Justice Statute
to make a "solemn declaration.., that he will exercise his powers
impartially and conscientiously."'1 But this provision is not the
only safeguard in the statute to help insure a judge's impartiality.
The framers of the statute believed that the national States would
have greater confidence in the court if there were additional safe-
guards.2 Which articles in the statute restrict judicial bias and
which articles, if any, overlook its possible existence? For this
purpose the statute is measured by two standards: (1) a method
of appointing judges which places judicial qualifications above
political considerations, and (2) methods of safeguards to im-
partiality after appointment.
* Instructor, College of Law, University of Nebraska.
1 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 20.
2 The Statute of the International Court of Justice is the product of
three stages of drafting. In the first stage, the Advisory Committee of
Jurists, the most influential of the drafters, met at The Hague between
June 16 and July 24, 1920. Proces-verbaux of the Advisory Committee of
Jurists (1920), hereinafter cited as 1920 Jurists. Their draft was studied
by the League of Nations Council during its Eighth Session (San Sebastian,
July 30 to August 5. 1920) and its Tenth Session (Brussels, October 20-28,
1920). Proces Verbal of 8th Session of Council of League, League Doc.
20/29/14; Proces Verbal of 10th Session of Council of League, League
Doc. 20/20/16. Then the draft was considered by the Third Committee
of the First League Assembly. Records of the First Assembly: Meetings
of the 3d Committee (1920), pp. 273-318, 331-408. Two plenary meet-
ings of the First Assembly completed the first stage. Records of the First
Assembly: Plenary Meetings (1920), pp. 436-501.
In the second stage, the statute was revised. Another Committee of
Jurists (Geneva, March 11-19, 1929) drafted the revisions. Minutes of
the 1929 Committee of Jurists, League Doc. V. Legal 1929.V.5. Their
proposals were reviewed by a Conference of Signatories to the Statute
(Geneva, September 4-12, 1929). Minutes of Conference Regarding Re-
vision of the Statute, League Doc. V. Legal 1929.V.18.
In the final stage, there was a third Committee of Jurists (Washing-
ton, April 25-June 26, 1945). 14 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. At the 1945
San Francisco Conference, Committee I of Commission IV (May 4-June
14) was the last important group connected with the drafting of the
statute. 13 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs.
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I. APPOINTMENT OF JUDGES
A. How Judges Are Appointed
The most difficult problem facing the Advisory Committee
of Jurists of 1920-the original drafters of the World Court
Statute-was to decide upon a method of appointment. The great
powers each insisted upon a national permanently seated on the
court; the smaller nations were just as insistent upon "equality."
It was finally decided that appointment be entrusted concurrently
to the League of Nations Assembly where the small nations would
predominate and to the Council where the great powers would
predominate.3
The merits of the dual election of judges were discussed again
by the Committee of Jurists of 1945 and at the San Francisco
conference of the same year. A subcommittee of the 1945 Com-
mittee of Jurists recommended retention of dual elections because
"so serious a matter... should not be entrusted to any one body.""
At the conference, arguments were presented for and against dual
elections, some new, others a repetition of those first introduced
by the 1920 Jurists. Proponents in favor of election by the United
Nations General Assembly alone contended that Security Council
members would vote twice in violation of the principle of equality.
They further argued that dual elections would decrease the judges'
independence because the Security Council would give greater
weight to political considerations.6 Supporters of the present
system answered that the Security Council had the responsibility
of maintaining peace and security, that dual elections were a
check and balance, and that such elections were an additional
guaranty of competent judges.6 To decrease the influence of poli-
tical considerations within the Security Council, Canada suggested
that the veto power should not apply. Serving as a concession by
the permanent members of the Security Council, Canada's "com-
promise" was effected, i.e., retention of dual elections without a
veto in the Security Council.7
The General Assembly and the Security Council elect the
judges "independently" of each other." However, "independently"
has meant simultaneous elections with no comparison of candi-
dates until the full number of judges to be appointed has been
3 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 201.
414 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. 278.
5 13 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. 180.
6 Ibid.
7 Id. at 186, 203. See Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 10, 11 2.
s Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. S.
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elected by each body. Of course, the two electoral bodies do not
proceed "independently." For one thing, Council members also
vote in the Assembly, and presumably both Council and Assembly
delegations receive the same instructions from their government
regarding candidates. And nothing prohibits various delegations
from consulting each other. Indeed, at least on one occasion, con-
sultations were encouraged.9 Strong evidence of such consulta-
tion is the consistency with which the same candidates have been
elected by both the Assembly and the Council on the comparison
of results of the initial separate elections. 10
B. Who May Be Appointed
If the Assembly and Council were free to elect anyone, the
possibility of political influence would be increased. But these
bodies must appoint from a list of persons nominated by "na-
tional groups."" Each member of the United Nations selects not
more than four persons competent in international law as its own
national group. 2
9 During the December, 1946 elections, President Spaak of the General
Assembly said: "The third meeting for the purpose of elections will take
place at 5:15 pm; this will give the delegations time to consult each other."
U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1st Sess., Plenary 345 (1st Part 1946).
10 In the 1921 general elections, with 11 judges to be appointed from
89 candidates, 9 successful candidates appeared on both lists. P.C.I.J.,
Ser. E, No. 1 at 28 (1925); Records of the 2d Assembly: Plenary 250
(1921). In the 1930 general elections, 15 judges were to be appointed
from some 50 candidates; 14 succeeded on the first comparison. Records
of 11th Assembly: Plenary 134-135, 136 (1920). In the 1946 general
elections, the electors were to appoint 15 judges from 73 candidates. On
the first ballot, 13 successful candidates appeared on both lists. I.C.J.
Yearbook 1946-1947, 53; U.N. Doc. No. A/8/Rev. 1 (January 4, 1946);
U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec., 1st Sess., Plenary 341 (1st Part 1946).
In the 1948 general elections, 5 judges were to be appointed from 40 can-
didates, and 4 were appointed on the first comparison. U.N. Docs. No.
A/623/Rev. 2 and S/991/Rev. 2 (October 15, 1948); U.N. General As-
sembly Off. Rec., 3d Sess., Plenary 370 (1st Part 1948); U.N. Security
Council, Off. Rec. 3d year, 369th meeting, No. 119, 2-4 (1948). Finally,
in the 1951 general elections, there were 34 candidates from which 5
appointments were to be made. On the first comparison, the same 5 suc-
cessful candidates appeared on both lists. I.C.J. Yearbook 1951-1952, 20;
U.N. Docs. No. A/1879 (September 19, 1951) and A/1879/Add. 2 (Novem-
ber 9, 1951); U.N. General Assembly Off. Rec. 6th Sess., Plenary 210
(1951).
11 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 4.
12A sub-committee of the 1945 Jurists recommended nominations di-
rectly by the governments, each government nominating a national. It
reported that this would "minimize the political intervention of the Chan-
ceries which precede the designations made according to the present
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The freedom of the national groups in selecting nominees is
limited. In the first place, each national group, as stated in arti-
cle 6,
•.. is recommended to consult its highest court of justice, its
legal faculties and schools of law, and its national academies and
national sections of international academies devoted to the study
of law.13
Each national group can nominate up to four persons, "not more
than two of whom shall be of their own nationality."'1
Since only those candidates nominated by the national groups
are eligible for appointment (except for article 12, paragraph 2),
the duty of seeing that successful candidates fulfill certain quali-
fications belongs to both the electors and the national groups.
These qualifications, as stated in article 2, limit candidates to:
... persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifica-
tions required in their respective countries for appointment to the
highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized com-
petence in international law.15
Jurisconsults competent in national law without qualifying
method." 14 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 190, 260, 275. The question
was settled when Committee 1 of Commission IV voted against government
nominations. 13 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 180.
13 Consultation with learned groups in the English-speaking world is
done, if at all, "covertly, not openly," but in Europe it is a "matter of
course." Scott, The Project of a Permanent Court of International Justice
59 (1920). The Report of the 1920 Jurists seems to say that the na-
tional groups must invite suggestions, but that there is no obligation to
accept any advice given. 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 706. A
proposal before the Committee of Jurists of 1945 to make the consulta-
tions obligatory met with disfavor. 14 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 180.
14Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 5. It should be noted that the nationality of
the group is not necessarily its members' nationality, but is determined
by the government which selects the members. Thus the members need
not be of the nationality of the government selecting them. For example,
the Ethiopian national group consists of two members, one American and
one British. U.N. Doc. No. A/8, 67 (1946).
15 The 1929 Conference of Signatories adopted the statement submitted
to it by the 1929 Jurists that it "considers it desirable that to the nomi-
nations there should be attached a statement of the careers of the candi-
dates justifying their candidature." Revision Conference, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 53. This recommendation was approved by the League Assembly.
Records of the Tenth Assembly: Plenary 121 (1929). These "biographies"
are mimeographed and distributed to the member States before the elec-
tion of judges. See e.g., U.N. Doc. No. A/8 (1946).
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for the highest judicial offices cannot be appointed. 16 A further
qualification was introduced by the 1929 Jurists who drafted a
recommendation-not an amendment-that "candidates... should
possess recognized practical experience in international law." The
Conference of Signatories of 1929 adopted this recommendation,
which was later approved by the Tenth Assembly of the League
of Nations.17
Article 3 of the present statute provides that "no two of the
regular members of the Court may be nationals of the same
state."' s This rule of one judge per nation was adopted by the
1920 Jurists, apparently to enable as many states as possible to
share in the court's composition. Another reason appears form-
ally in the statute:
... the electors shall bear in mind ... that in the body as a
whole the represen+ation of the main forms of civilization and
of the principal legal systems of the World should be assured.19
C. Tenure of Judges
World court judges are appointed for a term of nine years
and may be re-elected. In rejecting life tenure, the 1920 Jurists
said that a term of years would insure continuity and make it
"possible for States to eliminate judges, who, though not. .. actu-
10 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 104, 298, 448, 449-450, 553,
561, 611, 698-699.
17 1929 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 25; Revision Conference, op. cit.
supra note 1 at 26, 27, 53; Records of the Tenth Assembly, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 120. The recommendation seems to have been intended to apply
not only to jurisconsults, but to all the candidates. In this, the 1929
revisers have strayed from the 1920 Jurists' idea of jurisconsults and judges
with national experience complementing each other.
Is Nothing prevents a party before the court from appointing an ad hoe
judge (article 31) who is of the same nationality as a regular member of
the court. In fact this has happened on two occasions: Access to Port
of Danzig, P.C.I.J.. Ser. A/B, No. 43 (1931), where Danzig appointed
Judge ad hoc Bruns, a German national, while Schucking (German) was
a regular member of the court; Treatment of Polish Nations, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A/B, No. 44 (1932), where the same judges were involved.
19 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 9. 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 713-
714. There is little indication that the 1920 Jurists had a uniform con-
ception of the meaning of "forms of civilization" and "legal systems."
Lord Phillimore (British) thought that systems of law would include
Japanese, Italian, Scandinavian and German, Slav, Turkish and Eastern,
British Overseas Dominions, Roman-Dutch, old French, Hindu, and Moham-
medan. M. Altamira (Spanish) referred to the Iberian and English-speak-
ing civilizations. M. Adatci (Japanese) declared that Japan was the prin-
cipal representative of the far eastern civilization and that there was a
Japanese legal system. Id. at 136, 152, 159, 369, 384.
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ally unfit for their duties, no longer justify the confidence that
the States at one time reposed in them. '20
I. SAFEGUARDS TO DIEPARTIALITY AFTER APPOINTMENT
A. Judges' Compensation
At present the judges receive an annual salary of $20,000
with the president receiving a special allowance of $4,800.21 There
are also provisions for travel expenses, subsistence allowance,
and a liberal pension plan.22 Although no statute provision pro-
hibits other remuneration, it is obvious that this is the only pay-
ment the judges are entitled to receive. The court further adopted
a resolution forbidding judges to accept decorations without the
court's consent.
23
B. Incompatibility, Disqualification, and Removal
A judge cannot engage in any political or administrative func-
tion, nor in any "other occupation of a professional nature."2 4
Being a member of the national legislature is not incompatible,
but holding a political office, or being a subordinate in such of-
fice, or serving as a diplomatic representative is incompatible.
Also incompatible are any "international political duties," but
"membership of an international tribunal, in particular, member-
ship of the Court of Arbitration of the Hague" is not incompati-
ble.25
20 192,0 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 714. But life tenure also in-
sures continuity. The only time it would not is on the extremely unlikely
occasion of all the judges retiring or dying together. The ambiguity of
the second reason invites unpleasant conjecturing. If a judge is not "ac-
tually unfit" for duty, then for what reason are States justified in losing
confidence?
21I.C.J. Yearbook 1951-1952, 114.
221.C.J. Yearbook 1946-1947, 130-134.
23 P.O.I.J., Ser. E, No. 3, 178 (1927). In 1927, the court authorized
Judge Weiss (French) to accept a decoration from his government. Id.
No. 4 at 270 (1928). And in 1928, Judge Loder (Dutch) with the court's
consent received a decoration from a conference of which he served as
president. Id. No. 5 at 246 (1929).
24 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 16.
25 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 190-193. 715, 716. By 1925,
several administrative decisions were made by the court in applying arti-
cle 16. Those functions approved were: Judge Loder acting as president
of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal; Judge Moore acting as president of the
International Commission on the Rules of Warfare; Judge Nyholm acting
as a member of a Mixed Arbitral Tribunal; Judge Huber acting as rappor-
teur of an Anglo-Spanish dispute regarding Morocco; Judge Altamira's
position as a Spanish senator; Judge Huber acting as president of a con-
ciliation commission; a judge acting as a member of a government com-
mission preparing copyright legislation or a government commission test-
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A judge is disqualified from participating in any case in
which he has previously been connected in any capacity; for ex-
ample, as agent, counsel, or advocate, or as a judge of any court.26
Previous membership on a conciliation commission would also
disqualify a judge.27 Article 16 permits a judge to exercise duties
as a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, of a Mixed
Arbitral Tribunal, or of a conciliation commission. But he would
be disqualified under article 17 if the same case were later brought
before the court. In order to prevent this occurrence, the court
decided that a "certain effective incompatibility" existed if there
was an agreement providing for judicial settlement by the court
where the prior method of settlement failed.28
If a judge feels that for "some special reason" he should be
disqualified, he notifies the piesident of the court. Or if the
president considers for "some special reason" that a judge should
be disqualified, he notifies the judge. In both cases, when there
is disagreement between the president and the judge, the court
will settle the matter.29  Several administrative decisions by the
court reveal the scope of this article. It is not a license to the
parties for suggesting to the court that a judge should be dis-
qualified.3 0 With the agreement of the president, a judge with-
drew in 1931 from an advisory opinion because he was the rap-
ing diplomatic service candidates; a judge participating in an international
conference concerned with the development of law. Those functions con-
sidered incompatible were: acting as member of an institution such as
the Conseil du Contentieux of the Dtalian Foreign Office; participation in
negotiations even of a non-political character. except in special cases de-
cided by the court. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 1, 247-248 (1925).
A more recent application of article 16 occurred in 1951 when the
General Assembly established an ad hoc committee for the purpose of find-
ing a solution to the problem of prisoners of war. After consultation with
the court, Vice-President Guerrero accepted the Secretary-General's invita-
tion to become a member of the committee. I.C.J. Yearbook 1950-1951,
103.
26 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 17.
27 1929 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 120. In applying article 17, the
court in 1928 decided that Judge Huber's functions as legal adviser to the
Swiss government would not disqualify him from participating in a case
in which Switzerland was a party. These functions did not fall within
article 17 because they were exercised before the dispute had arisen.
P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 4, 270 (1928); Id. No. 6, at 282 (1930).
218Following this principle, President Hurst in 1936 refused to parti-
cipate in a permanent conciliation commission because the dispute might
come before the court P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 13, 145 (1937).
2) Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 24.
30 P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 3, 186 (1927).
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porteuT, to the Council of the League regarding a related ques-
tion.31 In another decision the court decided that a judge who
had participated in the drafting of a convention which was to be
interpreted by the court was not legally required to withdraw;
had the judge desired to withdraw, the court would have ac-
quiesced. 32
Removal of a judge, if under the control of the Assembly and
Council, would clearly invite political intervention. Article 18
places this removal in better hands:
... No member of the Court can be dismissed unless, in the
unanimous opinion of the other members, he has ceased to ful-
fill the required conditions....
Thus far article 18 has not been used in removal proceedings,
but should the occasion arise, article 6 of the Rules of the Court
permits the judge concerned to justify his retention. A vote is
then taken in his absence and if the "members present" find u-
nanimously against him, he is dismissed. 33
C. Judges Who Are Nationals of Pairties
A judge is not disqualified if his State is a party before the
court.34 A party unrepresented on the court has the right to ap-
point an ad hoc judge, a scheme approved by the 1920 Jurists as
opposed to a plan permitting parties the use of advisory assessors
only.35 No new arguments were made by the 1945 Jurists sup-
porting a litigant's right to have a national on the court; but the
idea of assessors was revived, although one jurist was against
having even an assessor on the court. A Dutch plan would have
given parties the right to appoint by common agreement two more
ad hoc judges. It was also proposed that ad hoc judges must be
chosen from a standing list composed of one national from each
state. And an Egyptian jurist thought that if one of the con-
cerned judges chose not to vote, the other must likewise abstain.
Eventually the 1945 Jurists rejected all these innovations and
defeated a motion to eliminate ad hoc judges.36
Ad hoc judges are to be chosen "preferably" from those per-
31Id. No. 7 at 287-288 (1931).
321d. No. 8 at 251 (1932).
33 Statute and Rules of Court and other Constitutional Rules and Regula-
tions, P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 1, 56 (2d ed. 1931).
34 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 31.
35 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 168-170, 172, 198-199, 521, 527-
538, 565, 575, 577, 601, 614, 648, 720-722.
36 14 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 113, 116, 128, 265, 267, 309, 317.
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sons who have been nominated by the national groups for regular
appointment.3 7 By these standards the qualifications required of
a regular judge are also required of an ad hoc judge. He must
also make the solemn declaration that he will exercise his duties
"impartially and conscientiously." He may be disqualified under
articles 17 or 24, though he is not subject to article 16 (incompa-
tibilities).
When in deciding a case the court is evenly divided, the presi-
dent or acting president votes again.3 But suppose that the
president is a national of one of the litigants? This danger was
eliminated in 1926 when the court amended its rules to provide
that the president or acting president would not cast a second
vote if his country was a party to the controversy before the court
(Article 13 of the rules).39 In such an instance the judge next in
precedence would break the tie.
MI. CONCLUSIONS
In practice, a national of each of the great powers has always
been appointed to the court, but these nationals have never been
a majority of either the Council of the League of Nations or the
Security Council of the United Nations. 40 So demands by the
great powers for individual court representation by a national do
not require dual elections. Since political influence in the ap-
pointments should decrease as the political bodies participating
decrease, it would seem logical to eliminate either the Council's
or the Assembly's role in the appointments. However, while most
of the smaller states would favor the elimination of the Security
Council, none of the permanent members would agree. 1
It is folly to expect States to consent to a complete severance
37 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 31, f 2.
38 Stat. Int'l Ct. Just. art. 55. Only once has it been necessary for the
president to cast a second vote. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., Ser.
A, No. 10 (1927).
30 Revision of the Rules of Court, P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2 (Add.) 32-33
(1926); P.C.I.J., supra note 33, at 57.
40 Originally, the League Council was to be composed of nine members,
five great powers, including the United States, and four smaller powers.
The United States failed to join the League and never became a Council
member. In 1939, only four of the fifteen Council seats were held by
great powers. Even in the Security Council, the five permanent members
may be outvoted by the six non-permanent members; the veto does not
apply.
41 At the 1945 San Francisco conference, several smaller States ap-
proved dual elections, e.g., Czechoslovakia, Haiti, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, and Yugoslavia. None of the "big five" States favored
election by the Assembly alone. 13 U.N. Conf. Int'l Org. Docs. 180.
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of appointments and their participation. However proposals might
be accepted which retain some connection and at the same time
decrease political influence. For example, President Descamps
of the 1920 Jurists proposed appointment by an electoral college
composed of one member selected by each of the national groups. 42
Admittedly, political influence is not completely eliminated, but it
is reduced. Yet the connection is sufficiently close to create con-
fidence since governments appoint the national groups.
If this method of appointment is so far in advance of opinion
that its favorable reception must be postponed, there is consola-
tion in the knowledge that the present method of appointments,
although subject to criticism, has succeeded on the whole in pro-
ducing praise-worthy judges. Probably not all the judges have
been the best available, but all selected have met the qualifica-
tions required. It is true that the factor of nationality has been
prominent during elections. But so long as a successful candi-
date is qualified, the fact that another candidate, because of his
nationality, was unsuccessful would not justify strenuous criti-
cism. 43 And if it should happen that nationality caused the ap-
pointment of a less qualified candidate, it must be remembered
that a majority, if not all, of the other judges are eminently quali-
fied.
As for safeguards to impartiality after appointment, the pro-
visions for compensation, incompatibility, and disqualification are
sound. But the provisions for ad hoc judges have been criticized.44
Should a judge who is a national of a party be disqualified? Is
this connection sufficiently dangerous to a judge's impartiality?46
Statistics showing how often judges vote in favor of their govern-
ments have been used to support an affirmative answer. Pro-
fessor Lauterpacht contends the results "cannot be regarded as
a mere coincidence. '4 6  But Professor Hudson attributes little
value to "a mere tabulation of votes" unless there is a "carefvl
analysis of the substance of the views expressed by the majority
42 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 131-132, 142.
43 See Hudson, The New Bench of the World Court, 32 A.B.A.S. 144
(1946).
44 Notably, Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Com-
munity 228-236 (1933).
45 Nationality is not to be confused with a method of legal thought which
a judge acquires through legal training and which is closely associated
with each legal system.
46Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 44, at 230.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
and by the minority." Nor does he place any value on the mere
fact that an ad hoe judge is the only dissenter.47
It is submitted that neither a vote tabulation nor a "careful
analysis" is necessary. It is obvious that positive evidence is not
required to disqualify judges of national courts whose personal
interest or that of a close relative is involved. Nor did the 1920
Jurists consider it necessary to obtain such evidence to disqualify
world court judges under articles 17 and 24. Their conclusions
were based upon common knowledge that an exceptional connec-
tion between judge and party may endanger a judge's impartiality.
That nationality is an exceptional connection was not denied by
the 1920 Jurists, although their report alleged that the danger is
overcome because of the judges' high moral character and be-
cause of their solemn declaration to be impartial.4 However,
such a declaration can only refer to conscious partiality; it over-
looks the real possibility that judges may be influenced sub-con-
sciously. The close connection of jurisconsults to their State was
attested by none other than some of these judges themselves:
Of all the influences to which men are subject, none is more
powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegi-
ance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and
to the great sources of the honors and preferments for which
they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives.49
Why then is a judge permitted to participate when his govern-
ment is a party? Because States, which alone can be parties,
would have it no other way. "States attach much importance to
having one of their subjects on the Bench when they appear be-
fore a Court of Justice."50  With a national on the court, States
are said to become confident that their arguments will be duly
considered in deliberations. The judge is to "put forward and
explain the statements and arguments" of his State. Moreover,
0
47 Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice 355 (2d ed.
1943). The United States Supreme Court has declared the fact that a
juror, who was defendant's former employee, was the only one to vote
acquittal to be some evidence of bias in favor of defendant. Clark v.
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 18 (1933).
4s 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 720-721.
49 Joint statement of Judge Loder, Moore, and Anzilotti. P.C.I.J. Ser.
E, No. 4, 75. Also to be considered as collateral to the nationality in-
fluence is the relationship a judge may have had with his government be-
fore appointment. And not to be ignored is the possible effect upon a
great power judge of the fact that his obtaining appointment owes much
to his government's support; more so than for a judge from a smaller
power.
50 1920 Jurists, op. cit. supra note 1, at 722.
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there is assurance that the judgment, "however painful it may be
in substance, will be drawn up so as to avoid ruffling national
susceptibilities in any way."5' 1
Little can be added to the arguments already presented by
the parties' agents and counsel. True, they are not present dur-
ing the judges' deliberations, but there is little substance to the
fear that competent judges will overlook relevant arguments of
both parties. Similarly, there should be no fear that they will
write an opinion which will ruffle "national susceptibilities."
It has been argued, however, that to disqualify nationals of
parties, would unduly diminish the court when several States are
parties.52 But in the entire experience of the court, if regular
judges had withdrawn, the required quorum of nine would not
have been threatened. The largest number of judges who would
have withdrawn in any one case was four.53 In the case Relating
to the International Commission of the Oder, seven States were
involved, but only three had a judge on the court.54 These multiple-
State cases are the very ones in which equality can be obtained
only by disqualification. In these cases, it has been several States
on one side with a fewer number on the other. It would be ab-
surd to suggest that the side consisting of a fewer number of
States be permitted enough ad hoc judges to equal the number of
regular judges. In such cases it is even more important that na-
tionals of parties withdraw since their votes will have more in-
fluence upon the decision than in a two-State dispute. Of course,
it can happen that over six States are parties with each having
a national on the court, and to disqualify them all would destroy
a quorum. To guard against this very unlikely possibility, the
system of deputy-judges used in the old world court could be
revived. 55
5lId. at 721.
52 Ibid.
53 The S.S. Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1 (1923); Interpretation
of the Statute of Memel, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 49 (1932).
51 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 23 (1929).
55 Deputy-judges were elected in the same manner that regular judges
were elected. If the full number of regular judges could not be present,
the number was made up by calling on the deputy-judges to sit in the
order of a list prepared by the court. Deputy-judges were eliminated in
1936. In 1930 the number of regular judges was raised from nine to
fifteen, the present number.
